

~~SECRET KAPOR~~

Chief, SE

1 S FEB 1958

Payeh/Albania

1957 Year-end Progress Report

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Action Required: None; for Headquarters information and files.

1. Attached is the year-end Albanian PSYCH Progress Report for [ ]
2. During 1957, our major effort in Albanian/PSYCH was spent in attempting to maintain two radio programs without a qualified PSYCH Officer. Although the quality and quantity of these programs was maintained with a good measure of success, this effort was nevertheless at the expense of other fields of activity. Our plans for 1958 are therefore predominately affected by this fact; we have very reluctantly cut our Albanian/PSYCH activity to the bone with the hope of still achieving the best results commensurate with our limited Case Officer time.
3. Under Project OBTEST, HTGRUBBY broadcast approximately 300 hours monthly into Albania, in which we attempted to cover the failures of Communism both locally and internationally, while trying at the same time to give encouragement to our listeners. However, upon direction from Headquarters, we have reluctantly agreed to terminate HTGRUBBY in the face of increasing administrative pressure coupled with the lack of a full-time PSYCH officer. AIRERM, AIPOET, and RNADUANA will be released from HTGRUBBY on 28 February 1958.
4. Our National Socialist radio (NATCOM), with AIPLERB as scriptwriter, will become the sole Albanian PSYCH radio effort. This program, which carries a "black" message to Communist Party members in Albania, was instituted in May 1957, and has since broadcast an average of about 55 hours monthly into Albania. [ ] a career agent with considerable knowledge of the Albanian scene, who was transferred [ ] in May 1957 will support Case Officer [ ] in the future direction of NATCOM.
5. Regarding Project OBTUSE, policy and operational reasons prohibited us from carrying out any leaflet drop activities. The "Socialist-in-exile" mail campaign reverted to Headquarters in early 1957 with the departure of our PSYCH Officer.

Attachment:

Year-end Progress Report for  
Albanian PSYCH

S/RSO/rkj

February 1958

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Dated:

YEAR-END PROGRESS REPORT - PRC/PRC/ALBANIA

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I. Plans for 1957:

Due to the lack of policy approval and means of delivery to properly exploit other propaganda media, the major planning emphasis for 1957 rested on radio propaganda. To this end, and for the purpose of supplementing the daily MURIMET broadcasts, a plan for a "National Communist" radio was developed. This program was to be directed specifically against members of the Albanian Communist Party. Planning for 1957 also included continued wind drift leaflet drops and a "Socialist-in-exile" mail campaign.

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III. Operational Results:

A. Summary of Achievements:

1. The most favorable estimate of our radio propaganda effort stems from attacks made on HIRSHKY by Radio Tirane in February 1957 and by Radio Tirane and Pravda in March 1957. Coupled with this is information gained from about a half dozen refugee interrogations that HIRSHKY is indeed not only popular with the Albanian people, but that it is also a cause of considerable concern to the Regime.
2. In addition to the very favorable evaluations of the "National Communist" (NATCOM) scripts by Headquarters (SUAW 16283, 16 July 1957), the Albanian Government's attempt to drive AIRLINE from the air by implicating him as a Sigurnd agent, gives, in our best opinion, evidence that NATCOM broadcasts are a thorn in the side of the Regime.
3. Monitoring of HIRSHKY and NATCOM near the Albanian border [ ] personnel plus information from refugee interrogations indicates that probably a fair portion of the programs are intelligible inside Albania.

B. Major Obstacles Encountered:

1. The three major problems that faced this program during 1957 were: (a) the lack of timely intelligence from within Albania; (b) inadequate and occasionally negative support from the Greek Services; and (c) the lack of a properly trained PATCH officer in the Branch since the departure of [ ] in May 1957.
  - a. Regarding the problem of good intelligence from Albania, we were faced with the following specific difficulties: the French and Italian Embassies within Albania are heavily restricted in their activities (SUAW 15294, 9 April 1957); we did not have any PI operations running into Albania; publications from within Albania are usually too late in arriving in Athens for timely exploitation; finally, refugee interrogations often produce information of only marginal benefit by virtue of the poor caliber of some of the refugees themselves.
  - b. The Greek Services have occasionally been slow in making knowledgeable refugees available to us. We have also received a few reports during the past year which indicate that the Greek propaganda effort, particularly on the Epirot question, conflicts to an undetermined extent with our own line.

e. The major problem was the lack of a qualified PSYCH officer. Every effort was made to maintain the normal schedule of the two radio programs although we were unable to give the daily guidance and close supervision necessary for high caliber programs conforming to Headquarters' policies and directives. Also, a large portion of our limited Once Officer time was necessarily consumed in examining the bona fides of ALPIRS and in controlling his writing until we could satisfy ourselves that he was not an enemy agent as was claimed by a captured member of the Sigurimi. The period from May to September 1957 was particularly difficult. [ ] a career agent, who had been brought [ ] primarily for work in PI and CX matters was made PSYCH Support Officer in May 1957. [ ] assigned to the Yugoslavia/Albanian Branch under the JOT program became PSYCH Officer. [ ] though lacking in language, area knowledge, and general PSYCH operational background, was, with the assistance of [ ] AIREAT, and [ ] able to maintain the POTOS Program and to perform the necessary administrative and house-keeping duties. It is worth mentioning that [ ] and [ ] have done a very creditable job in conducting the Albanian PSYCH effort.

III. Activities:

1. OBTEST - HIRUNBY: Throughout 1957, HIRUNBY broadcast an average of four fifteen minute programs daily simultaneously over two frequencies. This amounted to an average of slightly over 300 broadcast hours monthly. Each program was repeated one or more times according to its timeliness. Between two and three new scripts were aired each week. In addition, some of the programs were broadcast on a random basis when the situation permitted. In accordance with DAYTONER's earlier direction of HIRUNBY, the thematic direction of the programs continued to change from a militant, super-critical approach to greater emphasis on the fact that future leadership of Albania will come from within. It is this heroic element that HIRUNBY supports. Within this context, HIRUNBY has attempted to introduce the idea that we are not necessarily against the continuance of the Communist Government in Albania, but mainly against several of the harsher and more unenlightened policies of such a regime. In all fairness it should be added that we have not been totally successful in properly enunciating such a theme largely because of lack of continuous direction due to Staff personnel changes, and because the HIRUNBY staff is still somewhat pro-UNCASTING in feeling. On the other hand, HIRUNBY has been strongest in its interpretation of international happenings as they relate to the Albanian People.
2. OBTEST - NATCOM: The NATCOM program was instituted in May 1957 specifically to carry a "black" message to Communist Party members in Albania. Since most of the radios in Albania are owned by Communist Party members, we feel that we can be successful in tailoring these programs to a relatively well-defined audience. AIPLET, an ex-Communist intellectual, had prepared the thirty scripts which have so far been broadcast. Each script, about fifteen minutes in length, is broadcast twice each day; each program is simultaneously given on two wave lengths. This program is designed to encourage Albanian Communists to strive for more freedom from the USSR by tailoring Communism to their national situation.
3. OBTEST - Leaflet Campaign: Although leaflet drops had been scheduled for the 1957 period, policy and operational reasons precluded carrying out such activity.
4. OBTEST - Mail Campaign: With the departure of [ ] in May 1957, the responsibility of the "socialist-in-exile" mail campaign reverted to Headquarters. From local files, we are aware of only 156 letters which were mailed under this program.

5. **Refugee Interrogations:** During the past year, forty-four refugees were interrogated by the KAPOK staff for PI material. Twenty-nine of these entered Greece directly from Albania; fourteen entered via Yugoslavia. Seven of the persons entering from Albania claimed to have heard KAPOK, although they could not remember any particular program. Of the fourteen persons entering from Yugoslavia, six say they had heard KAPOK.
6. **Monitoring of RUMELI:** The last monitoring report from the Greek-Albanian border covering the period from July to November 1957 revealed that KAPOK was audible a great portion of the time.
7. **Miscellaneous:** Other necessary, although non-productive activities conducted during the past year were the destruction of a large number of accumulated leaflets, the disposal of food and other hard items, and the revamping of Project OBJECT files.

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IV. Plans for 1958:

A. Current Position and Operational Assets:

1. Project OBTST currently carries five full-time agents. Each of these five is charged with one or more of the following duties: script-writing, production of the four to five weekly programs, refugee interrogations, monitoring of Radio Tirana, and necessary research work. Each projected program is submitted for Staff analysis before it is broadcast. Heroin lies the biggest difficulty in our current position - for each program must be examined in the light of KUARK and PBPRINE policy restrictions, for its applicability to the current Albanian situation, and for the validity of its factual content. Coupled with this is the fact that the PSIGN Officer must also devote daily consideration to the operational and administrative matters coincident with the handling and management of these five agents.
2. Based on our hope that Headquarters would eventually provide this Branch with a competent PSIGN Officer, we attempted to maintain both HTURNEY and NATCOM without restriction. SCAW 17771, 9 December 1957 stated that no such PSIGN Officer was available and directed us to terminate HTURNEY. Although complying with Headquarters' direction, we feel the termination of the only PBPRINE anti-Communist radio (HTURNEY) directed against Albania in favor of a National Socialist radio (NATCOM) is a mistake in emphasis. We have therefore been reluctant to consider the termination of HTURNEY unless PBPRINE or KUARK policy so dictated. However, because of gradual administrative dissolution of the Branch by Headquarters reassignment of Staff Officer assets, we were forced to suspend HTURNEY. Finally we recommend that you explore with DIBORIO the possibility of establishing an anti-Communist AIRMAIL radio since they have both a national committee and available talent.

B. Plans for 1958:

1. Consonant with the situation posed above, and in view of SCAW 17771, we plan the following immediate course of action:
  - a. Suspend the HTURNEY portion of Project OBTST.
  - b. Return AIRPORT and ALBHEN to the United States and terminate RHADHANA in the field.
  - c. Maintain the NATCOM portion of Project OBTST on as regular a basis as possible with existing means. We hope to direct the emphasis of NATCOM into a slightly different direction as outlined below.

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2. With the termination of RUMBLE on 26 February 1958, we hope to have RUMBLE assume part of the function of an anti-Communist radio. This is to be accomplished in part by identifying the RUMBLE program less and less with international "Communism" and by sharpening our attack on Albanian Communism in particular by encouraging the type of "self criticism" used to some extent by Poland and Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent in Slovakia. We also plan to emphasize and pinpoint attacks on the numerous built-in vulnerabilities of 20th century Communism. It does not appear that this projected transition will be difficult because ALPLINE has already given indications in several scripts that although he maintains a consistent National Socialist approach he may be slowly turning from Communism himself.
3. With the closure of RUMBLE, RUMBLE will assume some if not all of the broadcast time heretofore allotted to RUMBLE.

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V. Personnel:

1. After the release of AIRPORT, ALBEMARLE, and RYADUANA from HUNGARY, the Albanian PSYCH program will have available [ ] AIRLINE, and AIRBAT (part time). On this basis, we hope that [ ] and [ ] can spend more time with AIRLINE for the purpose of guaranteeing high-quality scripts.
2. No attempt will be made to increase the OBTEST indigenous staff during the coming year, or to increase the area of activity beyond the limits described above without the necessary arrival of a full time, qualified Albanian PSYCH Staff officer.

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